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Avoiding Religious Apartheid: Affording
Equal Treatment for Student-Initiated
Religious Expression in Public Schools
John W. Whitehead*
I. INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, a few students at a public high school organized
a group called "Students for Voluntary Prayer."' The group sought
permission from the school's principal to conduct communal prayer
meetings in a classroom before the start of each school day.2 The stu-
dents made it clear that they were not seeking supervision or faculty
involvement, and that their activities were completely voluntary and
would not conflict with other school functions.3 This request for stu-
dent-initiated religious expression was disallowed by public school
authorities, and the students filed suit seeking vindication for the de-
nial of their free exercise, free speech, free association, and equal
protection rights.4 The students lost their case in both the district
court5 and the court of appeals on establishment clause grounds.6
The court of appeals went so far as to suggest that even the appear-
ance of government involvement with such a gathering of students
"is too dangerous to permit."7
* President, The Rutherford Institute, Manassas, Virginia; J.D., University of
Arkansas, 1974; B.A., University of Arkansas, 1969.
1. Brandon v. Board of Educ. of the Guilderland Cent. School Dist., 635 F.2d 971,
973 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. 487 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 635 F.2d 971 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1123 (1981).
6. Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978-80.
7. Id. at 978.
The attitude of the courts, as well as of others,8 seems to imply
that somehow students who seek religious expression in the public
schools are circumscribed and segregated and, thus, do not have equal
treatment under the law. This approach is a form of religious
apartheid which threatens the rights of an entire class of citizens.
Certainly, there has been a plethora of debate concerning the consti-
tutionality of religious activity on the public school campus. 9
Although state-sponsored and required religious activity on the pub-
lic school campus indubitably falls within the strictures of the estab-
lishment clause,' 0 student-initiated religious expression 1 on the
public school campus12 should be protected under the free speech
clause.13
8. See, e.g., Ares, Religious Meetings in the Public High School: Freedom of
Speech or Establishment of Religion?, 20 U.C.D. L. REV. 313 (1987); Teitel, When Sepa-
rate Is Equal Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in the
Public Schools, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 174 (1987); Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal
Access Policies and Legislation Allowing Organized Student-Initiated Religious Activi-
ties in the Public High Schools: A Proposal for a Unitary First Amendment Forum
Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 529 (1985); Note, The Right of Public High School
Students to Conduct a Prayer Group on Public School Premises During Student Activ-
ity Period, 10 T. MARSHALL L.J. 449 (1985).
9. See, e.g., Piele & Pitt, The Use of School Facilities by Student Groups for Reli-
gious Activities, 13 J. LAw. & ED. 197 (1984); Stone, The Equal Access Controversy:
The Religion Clauses and the Meaning of "Neutrality", 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 168 (1986);
Strossen, A Framework for Evaluating Equal Access Claims by Student Religious
Groups: Is There a Window for Free Speech in the Wall Separating Church and
State?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 143 (1985); Note, Religious Liberty in the Public High
School Bible Study Clubs, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 933 (1984); Note, The Constitu-
tional Dimensions of Student-Initiated Religious Activity in Public High Schools, 92
YALE L.J. 499 (1983) [hereinafter Student-Initiated Activity]; Note, The Constitutional-
ity of Student-Initiated Religious Meetings on Public School Grounds, 50 U. CIN. L.
REV. 740 (1981).
10. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981); School
Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); see also infra note
146 and accompanying text.
11. For the purposes of this article, student-initiated activity includes (but is not
limited to) any traditional free speech activities, speeches, conversations, literature dis-
tribution, meetings, etc., that would not be questioned except for their purported reli-
gious content.
12. The public high school is not distinguished from junior high or elementary
schools in terms of this article. Just as there is little to distinguish the high school
student from the university student, there is little to distinguish the junior high school
student from the high school student. As Professor Laycock notes:
[W]hen a junior high or elementary school does create an open forum, there is
no reason to distinguish it from a high school. Exclusion of religious speech is
still discriminatory and hostile to religion. The argument for exclusion still
depends on the premise that government approves of everything it does not
censor .... Student maturity goes to whether the school should create an
open forum in the first place. It cannot justify excluding religion from a fo-
rum that a school voluntarily creates ....
Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech
by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
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This article will argue that student-initiated religious expression
should be protected by both first and fourteenth amendment provi-
sions. Moreover, such religious expression is a preferred first amend-
ment right and cannot be contravened by any establishment clause
concerns. 14 To the contrary, the religion clause mandates an accom-
modation of the free speech rights of students even in the context of
religious expression.' 5
II. ACCOMMODATION
Accommodation of religion has both historical and constitutional
roots.1 6 Accommodation is the essence of government neutrality to-
ward religion as required by the United States Supreme Court.17 The
Supreme Court has relied upon the intent of the framers of the Bill
of Rights for understanding the meaning and reach of the establish-
ment clause.18 In fact, accommodation really makes little sense with-
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (affirming students' general right to free speech);
Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Bender
v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd, 741 F.2d 538
(3d Cir. 1984), vacated, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); see also Strossen, supra note 9, at 149-57;
Note, Religion in Public Schoolrooms-Striking a Balance Between Freedom of Speech
and Establishment of Religion: Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 1984
B.Y.U. L. REV. 671; Note, Religious Expression in the Public School Forum: The High
School Student's Right to Free Speech, 72 GEO. L.J. 135 (1983); Student-Initiated Activ-
ity, supra note 9, at 500-01, 504-07.
14. See infra notes 138-179 and accompanying text. See generally J. WHITEHEAD,
THE FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES AND HIGH SCHOOLS
(2d ed. 1986).
15. See infra notes 16-61 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 20-61 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Bender v. Williansport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 553-55 (1986)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 714 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783, 802-03 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 717 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629, 636 (1978); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 475 n.8 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (plu-
rality opinion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 220 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449, 469 (1971); Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 103-04, 109 (1968); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242, 249 (1968); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409, 422-23 (1963); School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-22, 226 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962)
(Douglas, J., concurring); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 564 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
18. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 719-27 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 434-36
(1961); see also McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213-16 (1948); Everson v.
out at least a brief look at its historical roots.
This historical record shows that the revolutionary and founding
periods favored government accommodation of religious practice.
Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, often cited for their dis-
establishmentarian views, in fact tolerated and approved numerous
religious practices in the public schools and in public life.19 Contem-
porary case law and theory support both this historical analysis as
well as the need to accommodate religion in American public life.
A. The Historical Perspective
In religion clause adjudication, no less than in any other area of the
law, Justice Holmes' statement is most fitting: "[A] page of history is
worth a volume of logic."20 The Supreme Court has determined that
"the ultimate constitutional objective" as expressed by the framers
and "as illuminated by history" is of particular relevance in religion
clause adjudication.21 Because of this basic constitutional presupposi-
tion, concrete, specific historical evidence of the framers' views on
religion and religious practices in public education must be under-
stood to determine the reach and meaning of the religion clause.
History provides varied and ample evidence that among the fram-
ers the universal sentiment toward religion was one of accommoda-
tion and, often, encouragement of a particular religion.22 Public
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947); cf Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-64
(1878) (analyzing historical meaning of free exercise clause). See generally D. DREIS-
BACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1987); J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 14.
19. In fact, Madison and Jefferson participated in some legislative activities on be-
half of religion that no doubt horrify modern separationists. For example:
On October 31, 1785, Madison introduced . . . [a] bill [in the Virginia legisla-
ture] which was appropriately called 'A Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Reli-
gious Worship and Sabbath Breakers.' There is strong evidence that this bill
... was... penned by Jefferson. The bill in essential parts exempted clergy-
men from arrest while performing religious services and mandated severe
punishment fpr disturbers of public worship or citizens laboring on Sunday.
D. DREISBACH, supra note 18, at 120 (footnotes omitted). See infra notes 25-42 and ac-
companying text.
20. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
21. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-78 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970); see also supra
note 18 and accompanying text.
22. Story noted:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and of the amend-
ment to it now under consideration, the general, if not the universal, senti-
ment in America was that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from
the state so far as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience
and the freedom of religious worship.
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 593-95 (2d ed.
1851); see also H. BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 515 (4th ed. 1927); T. COOLEY, PRINCI-
PLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 224 (1893).
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education was no exception.23 In contemporary society, accommoda-
tion of all religions, rather than encouragement of any, comports best
with the American mind and better squares with constitutional
guidelines.24
The views of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison have been pre-
viously recognized by the Supreme Court as most instructive in de-
termining the meaning and reach of the religion clause.25 Although
Thomas Jefferson cannot in the true sense be regarded as a framer of
the first amendment, the Court, in its early religion clause cases,
adopted the view that "the framers spoke in a wholly Jeffersonian di-
alect and those who ratified it fully understood that style of
speech."26 At the time of the drafting and adoption of the first
amendment, Jefferson was in France.27 However, through his corre-
spondence with James Madison, Jefferson's influence was at least
partially felt.28
23. For example, the Continental Congress enacted the Northwest Ordinance on
July 13, 1987. That ordinance, in part, provided: "Religion, morality, and knowledge
being essential to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged." Ordinance of 1787, art. 3 (1787), re-
printed in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF AMERICAN
STATES 52 (1927) (emphasis added). This early acknowledgment of the relationship be-
tween religion and education bespeaks a clear intent that religion, instead of being seg-
regated from the educational process was, in fact, inseparable from the educational
process. It is also significant that on August 7, 1789 (after the agreement to the final
wording of the first amendment religion clause and the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights), the Congress of the newly formed federal government reenacted the North-
west Ordinance. Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50-51 (1845).
24. See, e.g., irfra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
26. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 10 (1965). Moreover, as early as
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the Supreme Court had canonized Jef-
ferson's supposed version of the meaning of the first amendment religion clause by
stating that "it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and
effect of the amendment thus secured." Id. at 164. This was in reference to Jefferson's
statement that the religion clause built "a wall of separation between church and
State." Id. However, it has been noted that:
[T]he First Amendment was hardly the exclusive product of any one person.
Subsequent interpretations of the Amendment should not be controlled by
the singular statements of Madison [or] Jefferson .... An examination of the
early activities of the Federal Government indicates that the people approved
and welcomed its aid to church-related activities.... There was undoubtedly
the faith that subsequent generations of Americans would be able to utilize
the power of the Federal Government to promote the concurrent interests of
government and religion under First Amendment norms that were reason-
able, pragmatic, and just.
C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 207-
09 (1964).
27. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163; see also D. DREISBACH, supra note 18, at 115.
28. D. DREISBACH, supra note 18, at 115-16, 119. In many ways, the views of
Although the adoption of the fourteenth amendment eventually
resulted in the establishment clause being made applicable to the
states, 29 the historically diverse record of state-church establishment
nevertheless illustrates that the term "establishment" in the first
amendment had an institutional meaning: "The real object of the
[first] amendment was ... to prevent any national ecclesiastical es-
tablishment which should give to [a] hierarchy the exclusive pa-
tronage of the national government."30 As Jefferson's often quoted
expression stated, the purpose for the religion clause was to build "a
wall of separation between church and State."31 No wall of separa-
tion was intended, however, even by Jefferson, to seal religion her-
metically from governmental or public activities. Rather, the
institution of the church was to be isolated from the institution of
the state.32 That the accommodation of religious expression was
compatible with the "separationist" views of Thomas Jefferson was
particularly evidenced in Jefferson's actions in the field of educa-
tion.33 Moreover, Jefferson as president repeatedly departed from
the fastidious separationism which revisionist historians have attrib-
Madison and Jefferson were not representative of those of the framers of the Constitu-
tion. Both Madison and Jefferson were from Virginia and were central figures in the
fight in that state for the disestablishment of the Church of England. See Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428-29 (1962); Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-13, 33-42. Moreover, both
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, written in 1785
in opposition to legislation which would use Virginia's public funds to pay teachers of
the Christian religion, and Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in Vir-
ginia, proposed in 1779 and enacted in 1786, were central documents to these disestab-
lishmentarian forces. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in VIII THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON (1950); see also BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY
VIRGINIA 1776-1787 (1977). Not all states, however, shared Madison's and Jefferson's
fervor for disestablishment. As the Supreme Court has previously noted, at the out-
break of the Revolutionary War, "there were established churches in at least eight of
the thirteen former colonies and established religions in at least four of the other
five." Engel, 370 U.S. at 428 (footnote omitted).
29. Historical evidence of the framers' intent is made no less relevant by the adop-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1983),
the Court said: "In applying the First Amendment to the states through the 14th
Amendment, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), it would be incongruous to
interpret that clause as imposing more stringent First Amendment limits on the states
than the draftsmen imposed upon the Federal Government."
30. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (citing 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 728 (1833)).
31. 8 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Washington ed. 1861) (emphasis added).
32. In 1805 in his Second Inaugural Address, Jefferson said:
In matters of religion I have considered that its free exercise is placed by the
Constitution independent of the powers of the general [federal] Government.
I have, therefore, undertaken on no occasion to prescribe the religious exer-
cises suited to it, but have left them, as the constitution found them, under the
direction and discipline of the State or Church authorities acknowledged by
the several religious societies.
THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 341 (Koch & Peden ed.
1944).
33. See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
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uted to him.34
Jefferson was the founder of the University of Virginia. From its
inception in 1819, the school was governed, managed, and controlled
by the Commonwealth of Virginia. The question of the Christian
religion at the University of Virginia was presented to him. Mr. Jef-
ferson detailed his views in his annual report as Rector to the Presi-
dent and Directors of the Literary Fund of the University.3 5 Simply
put, Jefferson was not opposed to religious worship and study being
conducted on the premises of a public educational institution.36 To
the contrary, in order to perpetuate and accommodate the religious
beliefs and exercise of students at the public university, he recom-
mended that students be allowed to meet on the campus to pray,
worship, and be instructed together or, if need be, to meet and pray
34. For example, on three separate occasions, Jefferson signed into law extensions
of a land grant given by the federal government specifically to promote education and
proselytizing amongst the Indians. See Act of March 3, 1803, ch. 30, 2 Stat. 155-56
(1845); Act of April 26, 1802, ch. 30, 2 Stat. 236-37 (1845); and Act of March 19, 1804, ch.
26, 2 Stat. 271-72 (1845). Further, in 1803, President Jefferson proposed to the United
States Senate a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians in which the federal government
would agree to "give annually for seven years one hundred dollars towards the support
of a priest" and "further give the sum of three dollars to assist the said tribe in the
erection of a church." A Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kaskas-
kia Tribe of Indians, 7 Stat. 78-79 (1846). The treaty was ratified on December 23,
1803, and included a specific appropriation for a Catholic mission, at President Jeffer-
son's request. Id.
35. Jefferson said:
The want of instruction in the various creeds of religious faith existing among
our citizens presents, therefore, a chasm in general institution of the useful
sciences.... A remedy, however, has been suggested of promising aspec
which, while it excludes the public authorities from the domain of religious
freedom, will give to the sectarian schools of divinity the full benefit the pub-
lic provisions made for instruction in the other branches of science... It has,
therefore, been in contemplation, and suggested by some pious individuals,
who perceive the advantages of associating other studies with those of reli-
gion, to establish their religious schools on the confines of the University, so as
to give to their students ready and convenient access and attendance on the
scientific lectures of the University; and to maintain, by that means, those des-
tined for religious professions on as high a standing of science, and of personal
weight and respectability, as may be obtained by others from the benefits of
the University. Such establishments would offer the further and great advan-
tage of enabling the students of the University to attend religious exercise
with the professor of their particular sect, whether in rooms of the building
still to be erected, and destined to that purpose under impartial regulations,
as proposed in the same report of the commissioners, or in the lecturing room
of such professor.... Such an arrangement would complete the circle of the
useful sciences embraced by this institution, and would fill the chasm now ex-
isting, on principles which would leave inviolate the constitutional freedom of
religion.
19 THE WRITINGS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 414-17 (Memorial ed. 1904) (emphasis added).
36. Id.
with their professors.3 7 He wanted only to "exclude the public au-
thorities from the domain of religious freedom,"38 i.e., from prescrib-
ing religious expression. Surely, Jefferson would not have objected
to student-initiated free expression on the premises of a public
school.3 9
It is also significant that when Congress initially authorized the
public schools for the nation's capital, the first president of the school
board was Jefferson himself.40 In fact, Jefferson "was the chief au-
thor of the first plan of public education adopted for the City of
Washington."4 1 The first official report on file indicates that the Bi-
ble and Watts Hymnal were the principal, if not the only, books then
in use for reading by the public school student.42
Accommodation, of course, does not stop with the historical pro-
cess. It also finds strength in modern legal commentary and case
law. 43
B. Contemporary Accommodation
First amendment neutrality mandates that the public schools pres-
ent no affront to the spiritual needs and concerns of their students. 44
Under contemporary religion clause adjudication, this means, as Pro-
fessor Laycock has argued, "government conduct that insofar as pos-
sible neither encourages nor discourages religious belief or
practice." 45 Insofar as free speech is concerned, "the government
must be neutral both in its own speech and in its treatment of private
speech. It may not take a position on questions of religion in its own
speech, and it must treat religious speech by private speakers exactly
like secular speech by private speakers."46 The private, personal
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. James Madison was a Member of the Board of Visitors which approved the re-
port of Jefferson made as Rector, providing an indication of Madison's views on the
constitutionality of voluntary religious worship and education in public schools. Regu-
lations Adopted by the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia, October 4, 1824,
Jefferson, Madison, Breckenridge, Cocke, Loyally, and Cabell Being Present, cited in
THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1110 (Padover ed. 1943).
40. Wilson, Public Schools of Washington, 1 RECORDS OF THE COLUMBIA HISTORI-
CAL SOCIETY 4 (1897).
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id. at 9.
43. See infra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 624 (1942) (Black, Douglas, Murphy, J.
J., dissenting) (finding that "our democratic form of government... has a high respon-
sibility to accommodate itself to the religious view of minorities, however unpopular
and unorthodox those views may be"), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (for reasons stated
in original dissenting opinions).
45. Laycock, supra note 12, at 3.
46. Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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view of the speaker or speakers is the quintessence of student-initi-
ated religious speech.
Restraining, banning, or prohibiting student-initiated religious ex-
pression in public schools has significant "chilling effects" on first
amendment rights of students.47 First, it prefers those who believe in
no religion over those who believe.48 Second, it subjugates the free
speech and exercise clauses to establishment clause interests,49 thus
creating an inherent inconsistency within the first amendment itself.
Giving establishment interests precedence over free exercise inter-
ests creates a bludgeoning effect in that the establishment clause be-
comes a weapon to repress free speech and exercise rights.50
It should be obvious that governmental actions, which are "simply
a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people
of this country," are not per se an establishment of religion.51 It
should be equally clear that the "limits of permissible state accommo-
dation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterfer-
ence mandated by the free exercise clause. To equate the two would
be to deny a national heritage with roots in the Revolution itself."52
Therefore, as the Supreme Court has held, "there is room for play in
the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality" toward religion.53
47. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). See generally Schauer, Fear,
Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Fffect", 58 B.U.L. REV. 685
(1978).
48. See School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225
(1963) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
49. As noted by Kauper:
If the protection afforded in the name of religious freedom against a state-pre-
scribed non-theistic orthodoxy is that a person cannot be compelled to partici-
pate, whereas the protection afforded in the name of the establishment clause
is that a person may demand that any exercise promoting theistic belief be
completely eliminated, the result is that the freedom protected by the estab-
lishment clause is regarded as having a higher value than the freedom pro-
tected by the free exercise clause.
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031, 1063
(1963).
50. The Supreme Court has recognized the need for a balance of interests in the
first amendment. For example, in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), the court
noted: "As Widmar and our other decisions indicate, a program... that neutrally pro-
vides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens [i.e., religious and nonreligious] is
not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause." Id. at 398-99 (em-
phasis added); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); cf. Bowen v. Kendrick,
108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
51. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
52. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 423 (1963)) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608
(1961).
53. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
This "benevolence" is mandated when student-initiated religious ex-
pression is involved or when basic constitutional rights will. be
violated.54
Alfred North Whitehead once pointed out that education is an es-
sentially religious inquiry.5 5 Education, as contrasted with vocational
training, requires an examination and discussion of fundamental val-
ues.5 6 Public schools obviously intrude into the area of religion with
courses in comparative religion, philosophy, ethics, sex education, and
values clarification. As Professor Giannella notes: "Unlike ... other
areas, formal public education does not involve a pattern of regula-
tion in which the place of religion can be derived from the secular
categories.... [E]ducation directly touches upon religious concerns,
such as the meaning of existence and the sources and nature of
human values."57
Because of the state's ingress through the public schools into the
precinct of religion, it is constitutionally impermissible for govern-
ment to fanatically seal religious expression from its educational in-
stitutions.5 8 Such a secularization would prefer nonbelief over
belief.59 Moreover, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the Consti-
tution does not require "complete separation of church and state; it
affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely toleration, of all
religions, and forbids hostility towards any."6 0
The requirement of affirmatively mandated accommodation is par-
ticularly relevant in education. Just as state-prescribed religious ex-
ercises could convey-indeed inculcate-doctrines contrary to the
views of the student as well as the 'student's parents, the placing of
the governmental hand upon the shoulder of a young religious adher-
ent for freely holding and expressing religious views would be
equally inappropriate. In the past, the Supreme Court has sought to
"sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partial-
ity to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal
of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma."6 1 Nothing more than
this would be undertaken in permitting student-initiated religious ex-
pression on an equal basis along with other student expression.
54. See infra notes 64-140 and accompanying text.
55. A.N. WHITEHEAD, THE AIMS OF EDUCATION 26 (1952).
56. Id.; see also supra notes 22-42 and accompanying text.
57. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development-
Part II, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513, 561 (1968).
58. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-46 (1976).
59. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
60. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (emphasis added).
61. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.
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III. FREE SPEECH AND RELATED INTERESTS
A. The Tinker- Widmar Analysis
Any discussion concerning first amendment rights available to high
school students must begin with the principles announced in
Widmar v. Vincent6 2 and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School DistriCt.63 The issue in Tinker was whether the wear-
ing of armbands by public high school students during school hours
in protest of the Vietnam War was constitutionally protected under
the first and fourteenth amendments as a form of expression so
closely akin to "pure speech" as to be "entitled to comprehensive pro-
tection under the First Amendment."64 The Supreme Court upheld
the right of the students, emphasizing that "[iln the absence of a spe-
cific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their
speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their
views."65
In order to define what would constitute "constitutionally valid
reasons," the Tinker Court formulated a two-pronged test:66 a stu-
dent's freedom of expression is guaranteed on a public high school
campus if it does not materially and substantially interfere with the
requirement of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,
and if it does not invade or collide with the rights of others.6 7
In applying the Tinker test to student-initiated religious expres-
sion, the Court's insistence that "[a] student's rights . . . do not em-
brace merely the classroom hours"6 8 must be kept in mind.
62. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
63. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
64. Id. at 505-06. Since Tinker, many lower courts have followed suit. See, e.g.,
San Diego Comm'n Against Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471
(9th Cir. 1986) (antidraft advertisements); Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564
F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977) (birth control information); Jacobs v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973) (underground newspaper, profanity), vacated,
420 U.S. 128 (1975); Shanely v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir.
1972) (challenge to marijuana laws, birth control information); Thompson v. Waynes-
boro Area School Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (distribution of student
newspaper with religious content); Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or.
1976) (Communist speaker); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (birth
control and abortion information), qff'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); cf Note, The
Equal Access Act: A Haven for High School "Hate Groups"?, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589,
608-11 (1985); Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 625 (1984).
65. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Com. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511.
66. Id. at 513.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 512.
Therefore, under Tinker, "it is apparent that religious students not
only may be, but must be granted such a right, unless it could be
shown that discussions among students would materially and sub-
stantially interfere with appropriate school discipline or that . . .
[they] would collide with or invade the rights of others." 69
The Tinker Court also held that prior restraints on student expres-
sion would be permissible only in the presence of 'facts which might
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disrup-
tion of or material interference with school activities." 70 The core
word "fact" is essential to an understanding of the Court's reason-
ing,71 since the Court has previously refused to sanction prior re-
straints merely on the basis of past experience. 72 A prior restraint on
student-initiated religious expression would be justified only if the
"facts" supported a reasonable belief on the part of school officials
that such expression would cause substantial and material disruption
or interference with school discipline.73 The Tinker Court distin-
guished such a reasonable belief from an "undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance [which] is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression" in public high schools. 74 Tinker, "de-
spite permitting some restraints, grants extensive first amendment
rights to high school students, rights not subject to limitations merely
to prevent embarrassment or discomfiture to school authorities." 75
In Widmar v. Vincent,7 6 a public university denied a student reli-
gious club access to university meeting facilities that were otherwise
generally available for use by student organizations. 77 Finding that
the university had created a public forum by its general accommoda-
tion of student meetings, the Court held that the school's exclusion
of religious speech from that forum violated the first amendment's
free speech clause.78 Of importance was the fact that the Court reaf-
firmed the principle that religious speech is entitled to all the protec-
tions of the free speech clause.79 The Widmar Court also rejected
the school's contention that the establishment clause compelled ex-
69. Toms & Whitehead, The Religious Student in Public Education: Resolving a
Constitutional Dilemma, 27 EMORY L.J. 3, 32 (1978) (emphasis in original).
70. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added).
71. See Comment, Prior Restraints in Public High Schools, 82 YALE L.J. 1325,
1326, 1334 (1973).
72. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294-95 (1951).
73. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
74. Id. at 508.
75. Note, Prior Restraint-Nitzberg v. Parks, 35 MD. L. REV. 512, 522 (1976); see
also Comment, supra note 71.
76. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
77. Id. at 264-65.
78. Id. at 270-76.
79. Id.
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clusion.80 Consequently, the Court held the school's discriminatory
action unconstitutional81 In sum, the Widmar Court established two
propositions: first, the creation of an open forum in no way commits
the educational institution to the goals of the various students who
make use of that forum; second, the fact that the forum was of bene-
fit to a broad spectrum of both religious and nonreligious persons ne-
gated any inference of state approval.8 2
Justice White's dissent in Widmar argued that religious speech is
constitutionally different from all other speech because the first
amendment itself "distinguishes religious speech" from other
speech.8 3 The Widmar majority, by the import of its decision, re-
jected such reasoning as well as Justice White's attempted distinction
between worship and religious speech.84 Widmar, along with a case
decided the year before, effectively equated secular and religious
speech on public property.85
Since the Widmar Court dealt only with university policies based
on the facts in that case, it left open the question of the rights of reli-
gious expression on public high school campuses.8 6 Although some
lower courts have restricted the access of religious groups to meet,8 7
a federal district court in Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dis-
80. Id. at 270.
81. Id. at 277.
82. Id. at 267-76.
83. Id. at 284-85 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White cited the school prayer and
Bible reading as support for his argument. Id. at 285.
84. Id. at 269 n.6. The Widmar majority also stated that if a distinction between
worship and other religious speech could be drawn and administered, the government
is constitutionally incompetent to draw it. Id. The Court went on to note that even if
some establishment clause interest might be involved, the majority could see no reason
to distinguish religious worship from other religious speech since worship should be no
less protected than the proselytizing found in Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981). In Heffron, the Supreme Court rejected
the claim that religious speech is more protected than other noncommercial speech.
Id. at 652-53. Hefron is "[t]he Supreme Court's most explicit equation of secular and
religious speech on public property .... Laycock, supra note 12, at 12.
85. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 640; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
86. Note, Religious Expression in the Public School Forum: The High School Stu-
dent's Right to Free Speech, 72 GEO. L.J. 135, 136 (1983).
87. See, e.g., Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646 (11th Cir.
1984); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Educ. of Guilderland
Cent. School Dist., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981);
Mergens v. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools, No. CV-85-0-426 (D. Neb.
Feb. 2, 1988); Clark v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 671 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D. Tex. 1987);
Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 675 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. Wash. 1987); Ford v. Manuel,
629 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School
Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
trict 88 held that the Tinker-Widmar analysis applies in public secon-
dary schools in much the same manner as it applies to public
universities. Specifically, the court held that a public high school had
created a limited public forum for student-initiated speech by provid-
ing for an activity period scheduled during the school day.8 9 Thus,
the court required the school to justify its exclusion of student-initi-
ated religious speech by showing a compelling state interest.90 Ap-
plying this test, the court found that allowing religious meetings
during the activity period would not violate the establishment clause,
compliance with which the school had asserted to be a compelling in-
terest.9 1 The court said:
This is not a case where school administrators have adopted a rule or policy
requiring, or even allowing, students to meet for religious purposes. This is
not a case where a school teacher or other school official has adopted a prac-
tice of requiring or encouraging school prayer or other religious discussion in
his classroom. It is not a case where a teacher or other school official en-
couraged or counselled the students to request the opportunity to meet during
the activity period. It is not a case where the students represent a particular
religious denomination. Rather, in this case, a number of students, acting vol-
untarily and free of outside influences, have requested permission to form a
club and meet during the school's activity period on the same basis as other
student organizations. The request was denied on the sole ground that the
students wished to engage in religious speech. This decision was not based on
a judgment regarding curricular choices or concerns of discipline and order. It
was based solely upon the belief that the school board cannot exercise power
to grant the request without contravening the United States Constitution.9 2
The Supreme Court adopted a somewhat different standard for
certain types of student speech in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.93 Nevertheless, the Kuhlmeier Court was careful to em-
phasize the continuing validity of the Tinker standard in the appro-
priate context:
Students in the public schools do not "shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." [citation omitted] They
cannot be punished merely for expressing their personal views on the school
premises-whether "in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus
during the authorized hours," ... unless school authorities have reason to be-
lieve that such expression will "substantially interfere with the work of the
school or impinge upon the rights of other students."
'9 4
The student speech in Kuhlmeier involved more than the simple
message of armbands, or personal communication between students
on school property (that was at issue in Tinker).95 Rather, the ques-
tion posed in Kuhlmeier was whether the school could censor student
88. 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated, 475
U.S. 534 (1986).
89. Id. at 705-07.
90. Id. at 707.
91. Id. at 716.
92. Id. at 698-99.
93. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
94. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
95. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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speech in an official school newspaper that obviously bore the impri-
matur of the school. 96 In the words of the Kuhlmeier Court:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate par-
ticular student speech-the question that we addressed in Tinker-is different
from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirma-
tively to promote particular student speech. The former question addresses
educators' ability to silence a student's personal expression that happens to oc-
cur on the school premises. The latter question concerns educators' authority
over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expres-
sive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reason-
ably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may
fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they
occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by
faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to stu-
dent participants and audiences. 9 7
The Court found that when student speech is promoted or spon-
sored by the school, educators are entitled to exercise more control
over the content of the speech, both for pedagogical purposes and to
ensure that the speaker's views are not erroneously attributed to the
school.9 8 However, the Court carefully summarized its analysis of
the distinction between personal and school-sponsored student
expression:
Accordingly, we conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker for deter-
mining when a school may punish student expression need not also be the
standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and re-
sources to the dissemination of student expression. Instead, we hold that edu-
cators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activi-
ties so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.
9 9
The clear import of Kuhlmeier is that schools can exercise reason-
able control over both the style and content of student speech that is
officially sponsored by the school.100 When, however, student speech
96. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 568-69.
97. Id. at 569-70 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 570.
99. Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
100. Even when school-sponsored speech is involved, however, school officials may
not exercise editorial control over the content of student speech if the school facility
or medium (such as a school newspaper or teacher mailbox) has been opened by policy
or practice to indiscriminate use by the general public or to students or student organi-
zations. Id. at 568-69; see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37 (1983). The Court expressly found in Kuhlmeier that the school newspaper
had not been opened to students for indiscriminate use, and that the school had exer-
cised control over the publication and intentionally made it a part of regular classroom
activity. The paper was not, therefore, an open forum and the school could exercise
reasonable editorial control over the content of student speech in the school-sponsored
newspaper. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569.
is not school-sponsored but is solely the expression of the personal
views (i.e., private speech) of the student, protected speech can be
prohibited only, in terms of the Tinker-Widmar analysis, if the
school authorities have reason to believe that substantial disruption
of school work will occur.101
Moreover, the Kuhlmeier Court expressly considered distribution
of non-school material not to be school-sponsored student speech sub-
ject to the editorial control of school authorities.l0 2 Kuhlmeier,
rather than detracting from the reasoned precepts of either Tinker or
Widmar, re-emphasizes the general principles inherent in the
Court's thinking on freedom of expression. As such, student-initiated
religious expression would fall clearly within the Tinker-Widmar
analysis and not within the school-sponsored parameter of
Kuhlmeier.103
B. Content-Related Censorship and the Public Forum Question
The core principle of the first amendment is that "government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content." 0 4 The Supreme Court has reiterated
this principle on so many occasions, often in lengthy and eloquent
statements, that it requires no extended analysis.105
The first amendment not only prohibits the government from
favoring one viewpoint over another, but also prohibits the govern-
ment from seeking to avoid public controversy by banning speech on
an entire subject.10 6 If a public school's response is to ban not only
student-initiated religious speech but all student-initiated speech,
religious and secular, the result is contrary to first amendment
principles.107
101. See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text.
102. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 570 n.3 (emphasis added).
103. There has been a move in some states by way of legislation to remove any per-
ceived restrictions of Kuhlmeier. See, e.g., Hentoff, The Duke Goes Up Against the
Supreme Court, Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1988, at A27.
104. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
105. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-
37 (1980); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
444-45 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 104 (1940).
106. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537. "The First Amendment's hostility to
content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but
also to prohibitions of public discussion of an entire topic." Id.
107. See generally Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis,
34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981). See also Laycock, supra note 12, at 13. "[S]uppression of
speech is not desirable or constitutional merely because it can be characterized as
evenhanded. Nor is it evenhanded to suppress all speech on a particular subject mat-
ter. A subject-matter ban, though less egregious than a ban against particular view-
points, is still a content-based restriction on speech." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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The first amendment obviously protects political speech.1os Indeed,
Tinker itself involved political speech' 0 9 as have many other cases.1 10
Any doubt that the first amendment accords full and equal protec-
tion to student-initiated religious speech was settled in Widmar.il'
To argue otherwise in a democratic society is ludicrous. As Professor
Laycock has noted: "To say that religious or political speech can be
suppressed in a forum where secular and apolitical speech is pro-
tected is to turn the first amendment on its head."112 Also, to distin-
guish "protected" secular speech from a "less" or "unprotected"
religious speech is a base form of censorship and lends itself to reli-
gious apartheid.
Some public school authorities may suggest that while a complete
ban on distribution of political and religious speech (imposed without
regard to the Tinker standard of imminent threat of material disrup-
tion of school operations)113 might well be unconstitutional, a school
policy that merely bans "proselytizing" religious or political beliefs is
well within constitutional parameters. Apart from the fact that the
term "proselytizing" is unconstitutionally vague, there is no authority
for the proposition that the first amendment protects the right to
speak but not to persuade (or proselytize).114 Speech calculated to
persuade, advocate, or proselytize implicates the very reasons the
first amendment was adopted.115
A great deal of first amendment jurisprudence was formed through
108. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (per curiam); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
109. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
111. 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (citing Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); see also Poulous v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Jami-
son v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
112. Laycock, supra note 12, at 14; cf Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974).
113. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
114. The Supreme Court has held:
[T]he protection they [the framers] sought was not solely for persons in intel-
lectual pursuits. It extends to more than abstract discussion, unrelated to ac-
tion. The First Amendment is a charter for government, not for an institution
of learning. "Free trade in ideas" means free trade and the opportunity to
persuade to action, not merely to describe facts.
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945) (emphasis added).
115. Id.
individual attempts, notwithstanding governmental restrictions, to
persuade, recruit, or proselytize others to a particular political, social,
or religious view. As the Supreme Court said in a decision protecting
the right of the Jehovah's Witnesses to recruit adherents to their
view (i.e., to proselytize): "The right of freedom of speech and press
has broad scope. The authors of the First Amendment knew that
novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but
they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential
if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful
ignorance."116
A public school is not a "traditional" public forum, but it can be-
come a "limited" public forum for first amendment purposes by
designation as a place of expressive activity.117 The designation need
not permit all persons to exercise their first amendment rights in any
manner they choose in order to create a "limited" public forum.118
116. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see also Kunz v. New
York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). The Supreme Court, speaking through William 0. Douglas,
explains:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dis-
pute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea.
Terminello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
117. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 569 (1988); Perry Educa-
tion Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1983); see also, Piele &
Pitt, supra note 9, at 205-06; Strossen, supra note 9, at 170-71; Note, Religious Expres-
sion in the Public School Forum: The High School Student's Right to Free Speech, 72
GEO. L.J. 135, 139-49 (1983). Limited public fora are also implicated in the federal
Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (Supp. 1985). For cases discussing the Equal
Access Act, see generally Mergens v. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools,
No. CV-85-0-426 (D. Neb. Feb. 2, 1988); Clark v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 671 F. Supp.
1119, 1124-25 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 675 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D.
Wash. 1987). The student-initiated expression discussed in this article does not neces-
sarily involve any claims under the Equal Access Act, but in particular fact situations
provisions of the Act might be invoked. The Equal Access Act has also been addressed
in the literature. E.g., Cetron, The Equal Access Act of 1984: Congressional and the
Free Speech Limits of the Establishment Clause in Public High Schools, 16 J. LAW &
ED. 167 (1987).
118. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985),
vacated, 795 F.2d 215 (1986), the Supreme Court reviewed three categories of fora.
"Traditional public fora" are places devoted to speech and assembly "by long tradition
or by government fiat." Id. at 802. Speakers can be excluded from traditional public
fora (e.g., streets and parks) "only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compel-
ling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest." Id. at
800. "Limited public fora" are fora designated by government "for use by the public at
large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of cer-
tain subjects." Id. at 802.
The existence of a limited public forum is said to depend on the government's
intention to create it, and the designation of a limited public forum is revoca-
ble. But while the limited forum exists, only a compelling state interest can
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Thus, in Widmar,1 9 a state university which had an express policy
of making its meeting facilities available to all registered student
groups thereby created a public forum from which it could not ex-
clude student groups meeting for a religious purpose.120 Even though
the designation did not cover all citizens or even all the students
(only registered student clubs were included), the Widmar Court
held that the university had created an open forum.121 Practically all
public schools permit at least some student-initiated expression to oc-
cur. This general permission creates the limited open forum (one for
students only), and any exception must meet the test of being nar-
rowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest. 12 2 However, as
previously demonstrated, no compelling state interest exists for a
blanket prohibition of speech that proselytizes religious or political
beliefs.123
However, discussion of public fora and access thereto as defined by
the Supreme Court 124 is irrelevant in situations concerning student-
justify the exclusion of speakers who fall within the group for whom the fo-
rum exists and who wish to address a topic for which the forum exists.
Laycock, supra note 12, at 46. Any other government property or channel of commu-
nication is a "nonpublic forum." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. The government can ex-
clude speakers from nonpublic fora so long as the restrictions are "reasonable and not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's
view." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). There
are problems with the Court's formulation of the three categories of fora:
The most troubling thing about this three-category formulation is that censor-
ship can become self-justifying in the second and third categories. The impli-
cation is that the government can convert a limited public forum to a non-
public forum without any reason whatever, or even because of hostility to
speech. The government's intention to close or limit the forum may be shown
by evidence that it has excluded speakers in the past. A choice to close the
limited public forum is not constrained by a requirement that all speech be
treated equally; the government can allow some speakers into a non-public fo-
rum while excluding others. Thus, outside the traditional public forum, the
only real protection is that exclusion of speech must be reasonable and not
motivated by hostility to the views expressed. And the Court's application of
that test has been deferential. It makes little sense to apply the compelling
interest test to a category of cases and then let the government opt out of the
category at will. The limited public forum category needs to be remodeled in
a way that provides more protection for speech.
Laycock, supra note 12, at 46-47 (footnotes omitted).
119. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
120. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text; see also Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985), vacated, 795 F.2d 215 (1986);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 n.7 (1983).
121. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267.
122. Id. at 269-70.
123. See supra notes 108-116 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
initiated activity on the public school campus. It is certainly irrele-
vant when discussing Tinker125 (which controls in student-initiated
expression) since the case did not involve a question of access to pub-
lic property. 126 The issue in Tinker was whether high school and
junior high school students had a right to wear black armbands on
the campus to protest American participation in the Vietnam War,127
a right which the Supreme Court upheld.128
When a citizen claims a right to enter government property for the
particular purpose of speaking, it is relevant to ask whether other
speakers have been allowed the same privilege, or whether the prop-
erty is especially appropriate for speech.129 The various versions of
the public forum doctrine address these questions.130 However, as
Professor Laycock aptly notes, "public forum analysis is irrelevant
when access is not at issue. When citizens are going about their busi-
ness in a place they are entitled to be, they are presumptively enti-
tled to speak."'131 Since a student is generally entitled to be on public
school grounds during school hours, access is not an issue, and public
forum analysis is not implicated.
Tinker, which is pivotal to student-initiated speech (whether secu-
lar or religious), did not hold that the school had created a public fo-
rum. Nor did the decision in Tinker depend on the school's
intention. Instead,
Tinker held that the Constitution protected the student's right to speak, a
right that was not contingent on whether the school had allowed others to
speak... .Tinker thus protects the right to speak in the halls and on the
school grounds-in all the student's free time when the school is not present-
ing its own messages. It protects the right to nondisruptive expression such as
buttons and armbands, even in class. Religious speech is included in these
rights, and these rights have nothing to do with the school's status as a public
forum.1 3 2
In situations involving high school students, the question of capac-
ity often surfaces.133 Since Widmar, it has been argued that even if
there is no actual government endorsement, there will be an im-
proper appearance of endorsement if religious speech is allowed in
public high schools.' 34 The reasoning is that university students may
125. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
126. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
128. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
129. See supra notes 117-123 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
131. Laycock, supra note 12, at 48; see also Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416
(1943); Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 777 F.2d 1046, 1053-
55 (5th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 107 S. Ct. 41 (1986); Cass, First Amendment Access to
Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287, 1343-44 (1979); Comment, The Public
School as Public Forum, 54 TEX. L. REV. 90, 105-07, 111 (1975).
132. Laycock, supra note 12, at 48.
133. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 552 (3d Cir.
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understand the neutrality of an open forum but high school students
are too young and impressionable.135 However, this argument is
flawed, both factually and legally. Professor Laycock's assessment is
once more quite accurate:
The proposition that government cannot censor speech, and therefore that it
does not endorse everything it fails to censor, is not complicated. High school
students can understand the proposition if it is explained to them. That is all
they need to understand to avoid a mistaken inference of endorsement....
The proposition that government does not endorse everything it fails to censor
is fundamental to our system of government. 1 3 6
The constitutional commitment to free speech and equal treatment
of its citizens should not be undermined because of fears that the au-
dience will misunderstand.137 "At the very least, a heavy burden of
persuasion rests on those who would exclude some views for fear
that they will mistakenly be attributed to the state."138
Moreover, Tinker rests on precisely the opposite assumption in
holding that high school students are not too young or impressiona-
ble to be allowed free speech rights.139 If students are capable of
dealing with an issue as emotionally charged and politically sensitive
as a war protest, surely they have the capacity to handle a secluded,
voluntary prayer meeting. Insofar as free speech rights are con-
cerned, there is no reasoned distinction between the two.' 40
IV. NONESTABLISHMENT
A recurring argument, which arose in Widmar,141 is that the es-
tablishment clause prohibits any form of religious expression in the
1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); see also Bell v. Little Axe Indep.
School Dist.; 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock
Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983);
Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987);
Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified School- Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 243 Cal. Rptr.
545, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 327 (1988).
135. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
136. Laycock, supra note 12, at 15 (footnotes omitted); see also Bethel School Dist.
v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3164 (1986); Carey v. Board of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 945, 953 (D.
Colo. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); Albaum v. Carey, 283
F. Supp. 3, 10-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Strossen, supra note 9, at 160-61.
137. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827-28 (1975) (The state's interest in
"shielding its citizens from information" is entitled to little weight, even in the context
of commercial advertising.).
138. Laycock, supra note 12, at 16. A collection of psychological studies suggests
that adolescents resist authority and are capable of independent critical thought. See
Student-Initiated Religious Activity, supra note 9, at 507-09.
139. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
140. See Laycock, supra note 12, at 17.
141. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
context of the public school.142 This result is supposedly reflected in
the tripartite test formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.143 The Lemon
critera are: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.' "144
Recalling the Supreme Court's position on accommodation, "it is
little wonder that the key phrases in the tripartite test are 'principal
or primary effect' and 'excessive entanglement.' Therefore, in apply-
ing the test to a particular religious practice, if the practice no more
than 'incidentally' benefits religion, it passes the Supreme Court's
muster."145
To be specific, the Supreme Court has designated only six particu-
lar practices as unconstitutional establishments of religion .in public
schools.146 In each of these six situations, the government sponsored
142. Id. at 270-73.
143. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
144. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The test no doubt had its origin in School Dist. of
Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), wherein Justice Clark
explained:
The test may be stated as follows: What are the purpose and primary effect of
the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Con-
stitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Id. at 222. The tripartite test, however, has been brought into question in some recent
cases. See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983). See also the discussion of the Lemon test in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983).
145. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 20.
Everson and Allen put to rest any argument that the State may never act in
such a way that has the incidental effect of facilitating religious activity....
If this were permissible.., a church could not be protected by the police and
fire department, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair. The Court never
has held that religious activities must be discriminated against in this way.
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (emphasis added).
146. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1986) (state-directed and required
teaching of scientific creationism); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (state-directed
and authorized "period of silence" for meditation and voluntary prayer); Stone v. Gra-
ham, 449 U.S. 39, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981) (state-directed and required posting
of the Ten Commandments); School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (state-directed and required Bible reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (state-directed and required prayer); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948) (state-directed and required on-premises religious training). The lower federal
courts have followed suit. See, e.g., Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d
1406 (6th Cir. 1987) (benediction at high school graduation employing Christian theol-
ogy and prayer unconstitutional); May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 787
F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1986) (religious meetings held by teachers on public school property
unconstitutional); Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985)
(group meetings at elementary school unconstitutional); May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d
240 (3d Cir. 1985) (state statute providing for one minute of silence at beginning of
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and was actively involved in the particular religious activity. 147 The
school day unconstitutional); Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646
(11th Cir. 1984) (school's practice of permitting student religious groups to meet on
school property and churches to announce events over school public address system
unconstitutional); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669
F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982) (school board policy permitting students to use school facili-
ties either before or after the regular school hours for religious purposes unconstitu-
tional), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1981), aff'd, 455 U.S. 913 (1982) (statute authorizing voluntary students or teachers to
initiate prayer at the beginning of the school day unconstitutional); Hall v. Board of
School Comm'rs of Conecuh County, 656 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981) (conducting morning
devotional reading over school's public address system and conducting a course of Bi-
ble literature in a manner which advanced religion unconstitutional), modified, 707
F.2d 464 (1983); Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.) (stu-
dent council members reciting prayers and Bible verses at school assemblies unconsti-
tutional), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981); Brandon v. Board of Educ. of Guilderland
Cent. School Dist., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (school's refusal to allow students to
meet on school facilities for prayer meetings before or after school unconstitutional),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 983 (1982); Malnak v. Yogi, 592
F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (teaching course called Science of Creative Intelligence-Tran-
scendental Meditation unconstitutional); Meltzer v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 548 F.2d
559 (5th Cir. 1977) (distribution of Gideon Bibles, Bible readings on school facilities,
and a state statute requiring teachers to "inculcate by precept and example ... every
Christian virtue" unconstitutional), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089, modified, 577 F.2d 311
(1978); Despain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir.
1967) (prayer recited by class prior to morning snack unconstitutional), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 906 (1968); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) (school officials could
constitutionally prevent students from having an opportunity in the classroom for
praying), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965); Mergens v. Board of Educ. of Westside Com-
munity Schools, No. CV-85-0-426 (D. Neb. Feb. 2, 1988) (denying student's right to op-
erate Christian club); Clark v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 671 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D. Tex.
1987) (school district policy prohibiting student religious meetings on school property
constitutional); Ford v. Manuel, 629 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (renting school facil-
ities for after hours religious instruction unconstitutional); Graham v. Central Commu-
nity Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531 (D. Iowa 1985) (religious invocations and benedictions at
high school graduation unconstitutional); Walter v. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 610 F.
Supp. 1169 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (prayer amendment to state constitution for brief time of
personal and private contemplation, meditation, or prayer in public schools unconstitu-
tional); Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Va. 1983) (public school's Bible
program unconstitutional); Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013
(D.N.M. 1983) (statute allowing moment of silence in public schools unconstitutional);
Goodwin v. Cross Country School Dist., 394 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (student
council members reading Bible verses and the Lord's Prayer over school intercom and
distribution of Gideon Bibles unconstitutional). But see Florey v. Sioux Falls School
Dist., 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980) (rules permitting public school Christmas observ-
ances with religious elements constitutional), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980); Reed v.
Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (student-initiated voluntary prayer
before commencement of school day constitutional).
147. For example, in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the public school district,
under a directive from the governing school board, had the following prayer said aloud
by each class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day: "Al-
mighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings
upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
standard is whether there has been "sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of" the government "in religious activity." 148
These factors are absent with student-initiated religious expression as
with any student expression generally. Therefore, there should be
no serious doubt about the constitutional validity of a student group,
initiated by and limited to students, which does not in any way in-
volve the faculty or administration of a school.149
A. Secular Purpose
Student-initiated religious expression does not contravene the secu-
lar purpose aspect of the Lemon test.15 0 Allowing students to engage
in all forms of generally protected first amendment speech imple-
ments the fundamental secular purpose of respecting and fostering
the constitutional rights of all students.151 The issue is not whether
student-initiated expression is in part religious, but whether there is
a secular purpose in allowing students to exercise first amendment
free speech rights as defined using the Tinker-Widmar analysis.152
A secular purpose for allowing student-initiated religious expression
is, in the spirit of accommodation,15 3 to avoid discriminating against
religion and to comply with both the free speech and free exercise
clauses.154 This means that "[s]tate efforts to alleviate discriminatory
or state-imposed burdens on religious exercise [expression] are con-
sistent with neutrality, even though any such effort, considered in
isolation, will appear to aid religion."155
The Supreme Court has noted that "Lemon's 'purpose' require-
ment aims at preventing the relevant governmental decision maker
... from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promot-
ing a particular point of view in religious matters."' 56 Public school
officials, for example, who merely acquiesce in the student-initiated
religious expression along with other types of speech clearly would
not evince any intent by the school system to promote religion any
more than they would show an intent to promote the viewpoint of
any other expression they permit.
Respecting students' free speech rights not only has a secular pur-
148. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2868-69 (1987) (quot-
ing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
149. See Laycock, supra note 12, at 4. This would not, of course, preclude school
authorities from monitoring such meetings for reasons of safety and discipline. See in-
fra notes 179-183 and accompanying text.
150. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
151. See Toms & Whitehead, supra note 69, at 20.
152. See supra notes 62-92 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 16-61 and accompanying text.
154. See Toms & Whitehead, supra note 69, at 20.
155. Laycock, supra note 12, at 21.
156. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2868 (1987).
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pose, but is basic to the very mission of the public schools themselves.
As one district court has recognized, allowing religious speech by stu-
dents "would not change the secular nature of the school's objective,
despite the fact that [the students themselves] have a nonsecular pur-
pose."157 Further, the Widmar Court explained that a university's
secular aim of allowing numerous and diverse student clubs to meet
would not be undermined by allowing the meetings of a religious
club because "the university does not thereby endorse or promote
any of the particular ideas aired" in the clubs' meetings. 158 Similarly,
allowing student-initiated religious expression in a public high school
no more reflects a nonsecular or religious purpose than does allowing
the wearing of armbands by students to protest the Vietnam War as
in Tinker.159
B. Primary Effect
Under the Lemon test, an inquiry must also be made as to whether
or not the student-initiated religious expression would have the "pri-
mary effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion.160 The Widmar
Court held that permitting religious clubs to meet would accommo-
date rather than advance religion.16 ' Noting that religious groups
probably would benefit from the policy, the Court indicated the bene-
fit was merely "incidental," not primary.162
One may. argue that a constitutional difference exists between the
Widmar 163 decision, which required accommodation of religion in
college,164 and a high school setting where students arguably might
157. Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379, 1389-90 (M.D.
Pa. 1987) (emphasis in original).
158. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.10.
159. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
160. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
161. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273-75.
162. Id. On its face, then, the effects test is simply a statement of neutrality. The
phrase is derived from School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1963), which held that state-required and directed Bible reading in public
schools is unconstitutional. The effects test first appeared in Schempp in a paragraph
reiterating the "wholesome 'neutrality' of which this Court's cases speak." Id.
It has been suggested that the Court's continued use of the term "principal or pri-
mary effect" is misleading. Instead, "[a] more accurate statement of the Court's test
would be that the legislation for government actions may have no 'substantial' effect
that advances or inhibits religion." Laycock, supra note 12, at 24. See also Allen v.
Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 (1970), wherein the court of appeals recognized: "The question is
not whether there is any religious effect at all but rather whether that effect, if pres-
ent, is substantial." Id. at 949 (emphasis added).
163. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
164. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
perceive an accommodation policy as placing a government endorse-
ment on a particular religion. Although the Supreme Court has not
yet dealt with the applicability of Widmar's reasoning to high
schools, a federal district court in Thompson v. Waynesboro Area
School District 165 held that a policy of permitting religious speech in
high schools was not, and would not be perceived as, one which had
the primary effect of advancing religion. 166 Moreover, it would be
stretching one's imagination to believe that high school students
would believe a school to be endorsing religion by merely allowing
free speech without discrimination.167
A claim of endorsement where a public school allows student-initi-
ated religious expression on an equal basis with other expression is
irrational.168 Fear of endorsement is not enough to stifle free expres-
sion. Student discussion of religious concepts in no way implies that
the public school endorses their ideas.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that active participation by
the government is necessary in order for an impermissible "primary
effect" of advancing religion to be found:
[t]o have forbidden "effects" under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the gov-
ernment itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence.
As the Court observed in Walz, "[F]or the men who wrote the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, the 'establishment' of a religion connoted
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in reli-
gious activity."
' 16 9
There is simply no active involvement or official sponsorship of reli-
gion by merely allowing students their right of free speech. More-
over, a school policy allowing student speech fbr all students
(whether or not it involves religious expression) is exactly the type of
neutrality required by establishment clause analysis. The Supreme
Court held in Mueller v. Allen:170 "As Widmar and our other deci-
sions indicate, a program ... that neutrally provides state assistance
to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge
under the Establishment Clause."171 If the government can spend
165. 673 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
166. Id. at 1390.
167. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
168. As Professor Laycock notes:
The claim of actual endorsement is absurd. Perhaps in a totalitarian state the
government implicitly endorses all that it does not censor. But no such infer-
ence can be drawn in a nation with a constitutional guarantee of free
speech.... Before Widmar, my own university censored rallies by the Long-
horn Christian Fellowship but allowed Students for Freedom from Religion to
hold a "Phooey on Falwell" rally.
Laycock, supra note 12, at 14.
169. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2868-69 (1987) (quot-
ing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)) (latter emphasis added).
170. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
171. Id. at 398-99. "[T]he 'effects' test was intended to implement the neutrality re-
quirement." Laycock, supra note 12, at 25. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562
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money neutrally, surely it can establish policies conducive to free
speech neutrally applicable to all.
The Lemon "effects" test, it must be emphasized, has two sides. It
is unconstitutional as a primary effect for a public school to advance
religion, but it is just as unconstitutional for a public school to "in-
hibit" religion.172 A public school system would inhibit religion by
discriminately prohibiting student-initiated religious expression. This
is a blatant form of hostility toward religion prohibited by the first
amendment.17 3
Finally, if school officials harbor any concerns over endorsement,
they can explicitly state their position. "The school can explain its
open forum policy, and there is no reason to believe that high school
students are incapable of understanding that explanation."174
C. Entanglement
The final prong of the Lemon test forbids the fostering of excessive
entanglement between government and religion.175 This require-
ment should be easily satisfied in situations involving student-initi-
(1988), wherein the Court upheld, against an establishment clause challenge, a federal
statute that provided funds for nonprofit organizations, including religious organiza-
tions, for services and research concerning prevention of premarital teenage preg-
nancy. The Court stated:
[This law] is similar to other statutes that this court has upheld against Estab-
lishment Clause challenges in the past. In Roemer v. Maryland Board of Pub-
lic Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976), for example, we upheld a Maryland statute
that provided annual subsidies directly to qualifying colleges and universities
in the State, including religiously affiliated institutions. As the plurality
stated, "religious institutions need not be quarantined from public benefits
that are neutrally available to all."... In other cases involving indirect grants
of state aid to religious institutions, we have found it important that the aid is
made available regardless of whether it will ultimately flow to a secular or
sectarian institution.
Id. at 2573 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). But see Garnett v. Renton School
Dist., 675 F. Supp. 1268, 1276 (W.D. Wash. 1987), in which a "slight" benefit to religion
was held suspect.
172. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
173. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 314 (1952); Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-23
(1948).
174. Laycock, supra note 12, at 18.
175. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. Analysis of the entanglement requirement may be
unnecessary. As Justice White asserted in his concurring opinion in Roemer v. Board
of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767 (1976): "As long as there is a secular legislative pur-
pose, and as long as the primary effect of the legislation is neither to advance nor in-
hibit religion, I see no reason-particularly in light of the 'sparse language of the
Establishment Clause,'-to take the constitutional inquiry farther." Id. at 768 (White,
J., concurring).
ated religious speech where only the private, personal views of the
students are aired. In fact, a public school that allows equal treat-
ment of all speech helps to avoid entanglement with religious mat-
ters. As the Widmar Court noted, a school system actually risks
greater entanglement by attempting to enforce an exclusion of reli-
gious speech than by simply allowing all otherwise protected first
amendment speech.17 6 Moreover, at least one court has held:
If defendant imposes the same reasonable time, place, and manner regulations
on plaintiffs' (religious] activities that it imposes on other student activities,
the foreseeable entanglement need not be excessive but could be limited....
Neutral supervision without active involvement by a teacher or school official
in plaintiffs' activities would not be violative of the establishment clause. 1 7 7
However, it seems that no incidental effect is too trivial to be con-
stitutionally damning.178 It is not the mere appearance of sponsor-
ship but rather the heat, light, and supervision normally incident to
classroom use that are supposedly impermissible effects and
entanglements.179
Any alleged "entanglement" arising from the presence of a moni-
tor would be wholly speculative and, in any event, as one district
court pointed out, very limited.1s 0 Certainly, "[t]here is nothing ...
like the 'comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveil-
lance' or 'enduring entanglement' present in Lemon." 81 Arguments
that monitors (designed to keep order)18 2 of student-initiated reli-
gious groups are government endorsements and result in entangle-
ments are stretched, to say the least. In fact:
it is a long leap from endorsing the monitor to endorsing religion. When the
police are sent to preserve order at a demonstration, no one infers that the
city endorses the goals of the demonstrators. It is no more reasonable to infer
that a monitor sent to protect furnishings and to suppress spitballs endorses
the goals of the groups he supervises. 1 8 3
176. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.11.
177. Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379, 1392 (M.D. Pa.
1987).
178. For example, merely allowing a student-initiated religious organization use of
an otherwise empty schoolroom to meet on a public high school was held to be enough
of a benefit for it to be constitutionally suspect. Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 675 F.
Supp. 1268, 1275-76 (W.D. Wash. 1987). This was true even though the court deemed it
a "slight" benefit to religion. Id. at 1276.
179. Laycock, supra note 12, at 25; see also Corporation of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68
Cal. App. 3d 1, 12, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); Teitel, The
Unconstitutionality of Equal Access Policies and Legislation Allowing Organized Stu-
dent-Initiated Religious Activities in the Public High Schools: A Proposal for a Uni-
tary First Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 562-65 (1985).
180. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697, 715 (M.D. Pa.
1983), rev'd, 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
181. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (citations omitted).
182. "Given the disruption and violence in some of our public schools, the Court is
unlikely to hold that high school students have a constitutional right to meet on school
property without a monitor." Laycock, supra note 12, at 50.
183. Id. at 29.
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Clearly, providing a monitor is providing equal treatment to both
religious and secular groups.
The fact that student-initiated religious speech occurs on public
property and is thus, in an abstract sense, supported by public tax
funds is not suggestive of any entanglement. What matters is not the
location of speech but the identity of the speaker.18 4 This is central
to student-initiated religious expression because students are com-
pelled to and have a right to be on public premises.185
On the other hand, a school policy banning student-initiated reli-
gious speech violates the establishment clause by inhibiting religion
and by causing excessive entanglement with religion. One district
court stated: "[B]y prohibiting the distribution of Issues and Answers
inside the school building because of the paper's religious content,
the school may actually be engaging in hostility to religion. 'The es-
tablishment clause acts as a proscription against hostility to, as well
as advancement of, religion.' "186 A restriction on religious speech,
while other speech is permitted, sends a clear message to all students
that religious beliefs are disfavored by the school. Such open hostil-
ity toward religion is clearly impermissible under the first
amendment.18 7
School policies which restrict religious speech violate the excessive
entanglement prong of Lemon because they require school officials,
as agents of the state, to determine what constitutes impermissible
speech. Widmar held that it might even be "impossible" to ascertain
in a principled manner what is and is not religious speech. 8 8 In Cor-
poration of Presiding Bishop v. Amos,189 Justice White noted that a
complete religious discrimination exemption from Title VII of the
184. See Toms & Whitehead, supra note 69, at 15-19 for a detailed discussion on the
location issue.
185. See supra notes 123-133 and accompanying text. Moreover, "time, place, and
manner of 'involvement' is not an establishment clause 'concern.'" Laycock, supra
note 12, at 18-19. Simply put:
Whether the speech is on public or private property is wholly irrelevant if the
state lacks power to censor. It is almost a given that a public forum will be on
public property; very few exist on private property. Because the state lacks
power to exclude views from a public forum on public property, there can be
no reasonable inference that it endorses speech in such a forum.
Id. at 15.
186. Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379, 1390 n.7 (W.D.
Pa. 1987) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697, 714
(M.D. Pa. 1983)) (citations omitted).
187. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
188. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.11.
189. 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
Civil Rights Act was not only constitutional but was preferable to a
statute that purported to cover "religious" jobs in churches while ex-
empting "nonreligious" jobs.190 Justice Brennan underscored the
same theme in his concurrence: "[Dietermining whether an activity
is religious or secular requires a searching case-by-case analysis. This
results in considerable ongoing government entanglement in reli-
gious affairs."191
A neutral school policy merely acquiescing in student-initiated reli-
gious expression, along with other free expression, fully comports
with the requirements of the establishment clause. Such a policy
would have a secular purpose in allowing students to exercise their
free speech rights on an equal footing, would confer, if any, only an
indirect or incidental benefit on religion, and would not cause exces-
sive entanglement with religion. The establishment clause does not,
therefore, compel nor justify prohibitions of such expression.
V. CONCLUSION
In situations involving student-initiated religious expression in
public school limited forums, one does not find state sponsorship of
religious activity, nor state-mandated or endorsed religious exercise.
Student-initiated expressive activities involve private speech and per-
sonal viewpoints and are wholly voluntary, without violation of con-
science. Under these circumstances, a school system cannot be said
to lend its prestige, power, and influence to religious thought or ex-
pression. To the contrary, such a school system is merely allowing
free speech to flourish by avoiding discriminatory attitudes and ac-
tions against those students who express themselves religiously. By
banning such free expression, the public education system runs the
risk of practicing a form of religious apartheid that is hostile, not
neutral, toward religion. Simply put: "To tell students that they can-
not assemble to express their religious views and feelings amongst
themselves while other students are permitted to meet is not a neu-
tral position. It is a hostile one. Schools need not and should not
persist in such a policy." 9 2
190. Id. at 2870.
191. Id. at 2872 (Brennan, J., concurring).
192. Note, The Constitutionality of Student-Initiated Religious Meetings on Public
School Grounds, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 740, 785 (1981).
